Abstract: This paper proposes a new framework to model the system dynamics and study the system stability for the quantity bidding competition in power market. From the viewpoint of control theory, the quantity bidding competition is modeled as close-loop dynamic system, where market price is the system feedback signal. Based on the objective of maximizing individual profit in a shot-game, a general dynamic process is given to describe supplier's adjustment behavior, which can he used to model all classical bidding strategy and CV-based bidding strategy. With the application of control theory, sufficient stability conditions and market equilibrium are presented. Computer test results support the analytic conclusion very well.
INTRODUCTION
ARKET dynamics and stability have long M been studied by economists. Generally, an economic system is dynamic if its behavior over time is determined by functional equations in which certain variables interact in an essential way with respect to time horizon. Given the dynamic processes, if they converge to some equilibrium position, then we conclude that it is stable. To model economic dynamics, differential or difference equations are widely adopted, thus the corresponding analysis is based on those differentiavdifference equation~"~['~""~~.Traditional analysis methods are eigenvalue technique, phase diagrams, Liapunov's direct method, etc. Recently, the application of game theory has drawn much research interest, especially in the competition game modeled by differential equations['". But till now, there is still no systematic way to study the market stability, and the market equilibrium with multi-players is still difficult to solve with strategic bidding impacts considered , ffwu@eee.hh.hk)
In recent years, competitions have been introduced to power industry in order to improve social welfare and market efficiency. The real power markets are usually oligopolistic and individual suppliers will conduct strategic biddings to seek maximum Therefore, it is an important task to study the power market dynamic behavior in time domain and analyze the power market stability and equilibrium.
In the area of analysis of power market dynamics and stability, there has been little prior work. The first work came up in [2], where differentiavalgebraic equations and eigenvalue techniques are used to analyze the power market stability. It is found that the stability is essentially determined by the differential equation parameters, i.e., the suppliers' cost function parameters and the consumers' utility function parameters. But [2] did not make further study on bidding strategies and their impacts on market dynamics and stability. In [3], the market or bidding process is modeled as a closed-loop dynamic system in which previous and current information are used as a feedback signal. But it is based on a heuristic method and the given strategy is simple and non-general. In [4], the dynamics and mechanisms of bidding process are investigated. The dynamic model and system objectives are interpreted as a classical control problem. It is found that by introducing multiple bidding rounds, convergence to a Pareto optimum is possible if a PI control policy is introduced. However it considers a very special market situation, thus the corresponding results is not valid in a general case.
In this paper, for a general quantity bidding competition in power market, we propose a new framework to model the market dynamics and analyze the market stability. The basic idea is to model the competition process as a close-loop dynamic system, where the public known information (i.e., the price) is the system feedback signal, and the individual outputs are control variables. Based on the maximizing-profit principle in economics, a general dynamic adjustment rule is defined, which can be used to model various classical bidding strategy (such as perfect competition, Cournot competition, Stackelherg competition, etc) and conjectural variation(CV)-based competition. It is shown that different bidding strategies can be modeled as one-order inertia control blocks, and the system stability and equilibrium is analyzed using conventional control theory with bidding strategy impacts considered. This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents a general formulation of quantity bidding competition in power market, and the case of perfect competition bidding strategy is used as an example first. Section 3 studies different kinds of bidding strategies and their impacts to market stability and equilibrium. Numerical tests are given in the section 4 with conclusions drawn in section 5.
POWERR MARKET DYNAMIC MODEL FORMULATION
In order to make power market stability study, a general purpose power market dynamical model is formulated in this section, which is to be extended in section 3 for considering various bidding strategy impacts to power market stability and equilibrium. Basic assumptions made in this paper are as follows: there are n suppliers (generators) in power market with quadratic production cost function competing to each other in spot market to maximize their profit while serving the demand; the demand curve is linear and steady with respect to time (i.e., we only study the same hour of any day successively); electricity can not be stored, thus the power supply and demand are always balanced; and individual production cost functions are private and unknown to others; while the market clearing price is publicly known; generator i ( i = l ; . . n ) needs to decide qi with respect to available market price p with certain time delay (i.e., the repeated biddings are considered as continuous events); generator capacity limits and network effects are neglected at this stage.
Suppose the cost function of supplier (or generator) i is quadratic and the studied time period is one-hour, i.e: where D : total demand; e , f : coefficients can be derived from historical records and publicly known , and e > 0 ,f > 0 ; total supplyQ = c q i = D . Thus for a specific total supply Q , the market clearing price p is determined by equation (3). i=l Supplier i ' s profit function is defined by:
In the market, each supplier will make its optimal decision on qi to maximize its profit based on market information. We assume supplier's dynamic response can be described by '"I:
where Ai is a factor representing the speed of adjustment or the preference of adjustment intensity.
Equation ( 5 ) indicates that suppliers will adjust their outputs in the direction of increasing profit.
If a power market is perfectly competitive, price p in (4) is independent to individual qi , the Stability of perfect competition market is easy to analyze. However the real power market is usually oligopolistic and price p is dependent to qi (i = I;..,n). As we all know in power markets that qi is private information, and individual suppliers will conduct strategic biddings in real oligopolistic power markets. As a result, market stability is of great concern and its analysis is nontrivial. In this paper, market dynamic model under perfect competition will be derived first. It will then be modified to meet different bidding strategies so as to study their impacts on market dynamics.
In perfect competition, no one can influence the market price, i.e.,ap/ayi = 0 . Based on equations (I) and (4), we know:
And the first order condition for maximizing the profit is given by:
Defining an apparent 'price' (a coordinate shift to simplify the notation):
Substituting (6a) into (3, supplier i 's adjustment rule is:
dynamic By Laplace transformation, the corresponding transfer function of (8) takes the form: 1
Equations (8) and (9) show that the supplier strategy in a perfect competition spot market corresponds to a first-order inertia control system with gain and time constant taken as:
It is reasonable that IargerA, corresponds to smaller time constant, i.e., faster adjustment; and that larger ci , which means faster cost raising along with output increasing, will lead to smaller Ki and Ti , The system block diagram for perfect competition is shown in Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1. System diagram for dynamic adjustmcnt process
From control theory, the system will be stable if all the poles of the system close-loop transfer function have negative real parts, which is equivalent to that all the system eigenvalues have negative real parts using state-space equation notation. In order to simplify global system (See Fig. I ) stability, we introduce the following proposition. Assuming that ci > 0 (i = 1, . . ., n ) and according to (3) and (6), the market clearing price at individual optimum decisions or system equilibrium dq.
an. (14) show that although supplier i (i = I;..n) does not know his rival's ( b j , c i ) ( j t i ) , so far as he behaves according to (5) in a perfect competition market, the market will be stable and converge to ( p * , q * ) , where r T 4' = ( 4 : , -% J It should be pointed out that Fig. I is a general purpose system diagram for power markets. Actually different kinds of transfer function Gi (.) can be used to simulate various bidding strategies in oligopolistic power markets and their impacts on power market stability can be studied in detail. This is done in the next section.
Ill. POWER MARKET STABILITY ANALYSIS WITH DIFFERENT BIDDING STRATEGIES

A . Cotimot competition case
The real power markets are usually oligopolistic rather than perfect competition, where a few suppliers might have noticeable market shares. ,=I cr p' can be solved kom (13) and the system stable equilibrium is: As compared with perfect competition, the only difference is ci in (9) is replaced by ( f + ci ) in (1 7)
to include q, 's impact on price p , and hence on the profit zi . The system diagram is the same as Fig. 1 .
Based on the proposition in the paper, the sufficient condition for power market stability of Coumot competition will be simply ('; Ai > 0):
Similarly the stable equilibrium of the system can be solved for as:
supplier i 's rivals:
Assuming 
In terms of (20) and (23), the sufficient conditions for integrated power market stability are:
Usually f > 0 and ci > 0 (i = 1; . . , n ) , hence (24) can be satisfied and the market is stable. The stable equilibrium can be derived without difficulty: Fig. 1 can be derived based on (29) as: 1
and the sufticient stability condition for the power market is:
The system equilibrium is given by: Dynamic CY Case When CY-, evolves with respect to time, i.e., CY-, is dynamic, a key issue for a supplier is how to make adaptive estimation of CV-, using available market data. Define dynamic conjecture variation as follows:
where ' dq-, ' is a rivals' integrated differential with respect to the differential of ' dqi '. From equation (3), we can obtain: dp, = dp = -
Then
It is easy to prove that under the new CV definition (33), and for the extreme case of perfect competition, the CY_, is still equal to (-1) dP, --0 for perfect competition). It is clear that a 4, rational supplier will take dynamic CY-, t -1 .
The system diagram for adaptive CV-based competitive power market is shown in Fig. 2 with 
G,(S) and v,(q,,p,) defined in (30) and (36)
respectively. In adaptive CV-based competition, although the transfer function parameters (K,,Ti ) are functions of dynamic CY-, and time-varying, for a specific instantaneous CY-, (2 -I), each supplier's control system is still a first-order system. As long as the open-loop system poles are negative all the time, the system will keep stable. Therefore the sufficient condition for system stability is still (' : CY_, t -1) : f + f C V -i + c i > c i > O , i = l ; . . , n (37) It is easy to know that when CY-, moves off from negative unity towards positive, the system will become more and more stable, which means that Cournot competition (where CY-, = 0 ) is more stable than perfect competition (where CV-, = -I ) in the sense of short time period of price transients under same disturbances.
1V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The IEEE 6-generator 30-bus system is used to demonstrate the proposed method. The supplier parameters (including the cost function coefficients and dynamic adjustment parameters) are listed in Table 1 . Table 2 illustrates the system equilibrium and eigenvalues for perfect competition. The system eigenvalues are calculated through state space equation (See appendix ). As all the eigenvalues are negative, the system is stable, which can also be verified by the stability condition (13). The corresponding system equilibrium is solved from Given any initial condition, we can simulate the system time response. Fig. 3 shows the time response with the initial condition qi(0) = 0 ( i = l ; . . , n ) , where time unit is fictitious and used only for observations of qi 's evolution. 
B. Test case 2: Cournot competition
Under Coumot competition, all suppliers' CV_, are held as constant 0. Table 3 shows the equilibrium and eigenvalues for Coumot competition. As all the eigenvalues are negative, the system is stable. Comparing the results with Table 2 , we know that the system eigenvalues under Coumot competition are more negative, which means the market is more stable.
TABLE I11
Equilibrium and dynamic characteristics under Coumot competition (p'=14.76$/MWh). Fig. 4 shows the time evolution of suppliers' outputs. Comparing to test case 1 of perfect competition, Coumot competition will lead to lower total output and a higher market clearing price, and has a relatively faster response towards equilibrium. Moreover we can see that the individual profits are much higher than in test case 1. From linear system theory, we know that the linear transformation will not change the property of system stability. Therefore, if system 1' = Q'BQY is stable, the system h = B X is stable too. For system Y = Q'BQY to he stable, it requires that the symmetrical matrix QTBQ is negative definite. For matrix QTBQ to be negative definite, given any vectorU , it must satisfy the following condition:
U'Q'BQU < 0 (A-3) Denote a new vector V = QU , we can have: V'BV < 0 ('4-4) That is to say, matrix B should be negative definite. The system shown by Fig. I is a coupled negative feedback control system, in order to study the system stability we model the system with state space equation. Without loss of generality, consider the perfect competition case, thus we have:
